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A model of theoretical science is set forth to guide the formulation of general theories around abstract concepts and processes. Such theories permit ex-
planatory application to many phenomena that are not ostensibly alike, and in so doing encompass socially disapproved violence, making special theories 
of violence unnecessary. Though none is completely adequate for the explanatory job, at least seven examples of general theories that help account for 
deviance make up the contemporary theoretical repertoire. From them, we can identify abstractions built around features of offenses, aspects of individu-
als, the nature of social relationships, and different social processes. Although further development of general theories may be hampered by potential 
indeterminacy of the subject matter and by the possibility of human agency, maneuvers to deal with such obstacles are available.
Is a General Theory of Socially Disapproved  
Violence Possible (or Necessary)?
Charles Tittle, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, North Carolina State University, United States 
Several distinct philosophies guide the study of socially 
disapproved behavior (deviance), and the nature and im-
port of theories within each of those “philosophies of the 
enterprise” di!er. However, the most common approach to 
the study of deviance is that called “science” or sometimes, 
“theoretical science” (Tittle 1995). According to the model of 
theoretical science, scholarship has as its ultimate goal the 
development of theories to explain phenomena within some 
domain of interest. Within a science framework, theory an-
swers the questions of “why” and “how” in a disciplined but 
abstract manner. %eories tie together various particular 
“explanations” of more speci&c phenomena in such a way 
that the explanations can be derived from more abstract 
principles, while at the same time those general principles 
imply potential new predictions and explanations of as yet 
unexlained phenomena.
Scienti&c explanations are peculiar to concrete situations, 
events, or patterns while scienti&c theories are by their very 
nature “general” or abstract, intended to provide intercon-
nected explanatory principles that transcend the limitations 
of time and space. %ough theories are general and ab-
stract, they also di!er in the degree to which they can be so 
characterized, and the terminology is not always consistent. 
Sometimes scholars use the word “theory” to refer to any 
discursive e!ort to explicate any phenomenon, in any way, 
whether general or speci&c. However, theoretical science 
conceives of theory in an encompassing explanatory man-
ner, so here we will use the term in that broader sense to 
refer to a set of interrelated ideas or statements that provide 
abstract causal accounts of the phenomena within some 
domain of inquiry. %eories in this sense o'en set forth a 
basic or central causal principle that is theorized to apply 
with greater or less force under various contingencies, with 
speci&cation of the mechanisms by which such a principle 
operates.
1. Barriers to a Science of Deviance or Socially Disapproved Violence
Although many embrace the philosophy of theoretical sci-
ence and the bulk of deviance work in one way or another 
is devoted to the development and/or testing of theory, 
there are inherent di(culties in trying to produce a general 
theory of disapproved behavior (see Tittle 1985). Two such 
potential obstacles are of particular import in trying to gen-
erate general theories about individual actions that encom-
pass acts of violence. One concerns the assumption, neces-
sary to theoretical science, that behaviors to be explained 
share some common causes. %at assumption is especially 
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relevant to socially disapproved behavior that happens to 
be criminal. Legal standards of behavior are inherently 
arbitrary, being products of a political process. As a result, 
there is no reason to expect the various types of behavior 
dealt with in any given legal code, much less among legal 
contexts, to show obvious, manifest, or essential similarity. 
An array of criminal behaviors may include everything 
from failure to pay taxes to taking of human life without 
state authorization, and may include sexual violations and 
vice; such an array may also encompass acts prohibited 
through the in*uence of special interests as well as acts 
prohibited for the common good. Contrasts are especially 
sharp between criminal acts involving property or vice and 
those pertaining to violence. It is hard for most people to 
imagine that a theory explaining petty the' or prostitu-
tion might also account for homicide or assault, or that a 
theory providing such explanations could encompass trivial 
as well as extremely serious acts. And, this problem does 
not disappear if a theorist sets out to develop a theory of 
criminal violence. Indeed, given the plethora of behaviors 
prohibited in law, it appears that the only similarity in 
criminal behaviors is the fact of their illegality. %erefore, 
if general theories play on commonalities, the possibility of 
developing such criminological theories might seem to be 
exceptionally challenging. 
Even if legal standards are by-passed with generic de&ni-
tions of “normatively unacceptable behavior,” as I am doing 
here (Tittle 1995; Tittle and Paternoster 2000), or “force and 
fraud undertaken for self-grati&cation” (Gottfredson and 
Hirschi 1990), the absence of easily observed kinship poses 
challenges. For example, although there is no consensus 
about the formal de&nition, most people would probably 
think of socially disapproved violence as involving will-
ful behaviors that result in physical harm to victims, even 
though harm itself might not be intended. But even so, 
regardless of legality, socially disapproved violence en-
compasses a range of behaviors, depending on the society 
in question, extending all the way from domestic abuse to 
stranger homicide, including along the way suicide and 
unauthorized killings by agents of a state, and expressing 
various degrees of willfulness as well as harm. Is it reason-
able to think that a single theory can explain the actions of 
executives of polluting industries whose initiatives result in 
sickness to residents of a neighborhood as well as the acts 
of street gangs in protecting their turf? More pointedly, is 
it feasible to try to explain acts of socially disapproved vio-
lence of any kind using theoretical principles that also apply 
to non-violent behaviors?
%e second especially relevant hurdle to general theories of 
misconduct is the possibility that some human behaviors, 
including acts of socially disapproved violence, may not 
be su(ciently deterministic to permit the identi&cation 
of “causes” that can be theorized and taken into account 
empirically (Katsenelinbiogen 1997). As numerous scholars 
have noted, deviant behaviors o'en seem to have an emer-
gent quality to them (Felson and Steadman 1983; Luckenbill 
1977). %at is, they are not the result of straightforward 
causal forces. Instead, the prohibited actions grow out of 
complicated situational processes that unfold in unique 
ways as individuals act, interpret the actions of others, 
react, and so on, until the interaction eventuates in some 
outcome—sometimes deviant and sometimes not. Contrary 
to an extreme deterministic notion that individuals respond 
to causal forces in the same way that a leaf is subject to the 
forces of wind, humans are thought to exercise a certain 
amount of “agency” in deciding what to do and when (see 
Bandura 1989, 2001; Kahneman and Tversky 2000). So, even 
when all known predictors of the probability of deviance 
(Farrington 2000; Loeber, Slot, and Stouthamer-Loeber 
2006) are present, individuals are believed to sometimes 
choose conformity just as they sometimes decide to violate 
social prohibitions even when all of the known risk factors 
seem to be against such actions. To the extent that scien-
ti&c theories assume deterministic outcomes, then, general 
theories may always be ine(cient and perhaps impossible.
2. Theoretical Maneuvers: The Tool of Abstraction
Despite the di(culties involved in developing general 
theories about individuals’ deviant behavior, such theories 
are nevertheless feasible and desirable. In the remainder of 
this paper, maneuvers to overcome the problems of appar-
ent non-comparability and indeterminacy are discussed. 
In addition, it is argued that general theories explaining 
misbehavior already exist, although none yet passes the test 
of adequacy, and that they apply as well to socially disap-
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proved violence as to any other misconduct, making special 
theories of violence unnecessary.
While various deviant acts or episodes may appear on the 
surface to be distinct, it is the job of theorists to look past 
the obvious in order to &nd abstract connections among the 
elements at play in misconduct and from those abstractions 
to build theories providing answers to questions of “how” 
and “why.” In fact, the main theme and tool of theory is 
abstraction. As long as scholars dwell on the manifest as-
pects of behaviors, they are limited to descriptions, empa-
thetic interpretations, or perhaps ad hoc explanations. %e 
&rst step in building theory is for the theorist to free him/
herself from a focus on observable “essentials” of various 
kinds of actions. %us, if we think of rape, vandalism, and 
bank robbery in terms of their evident characteristics, we 
will likely conclude that they are very di!erent behaviors, 
each requiring its own explanation. For example, from an 
evident or “everyday” point of view, one act may be re-
garded, either by the actor or by others, as a physical act of 
aggression (or, some might think, passion), another a prank 
for fun, and the third as an attempt by the perpetrator to 
gain riches. Alternatively, from a non-theoretical stance, the 
three acts might be seen to di!er in the seriousness of their 
consequences, with rape being most heinous, bank robbery 
a little less so, and vandalism least. Yet, those distinctions 
do not lend themselves to general theorizing. Abstraction, 
however, permits these three acts to be seen as very much 
alike in ways amenable to theoretical accounting. %e &rst 
job for a theorist, then, is to imagine transcendent elements.
“Abstraction” is the name I give to the theory-building tool 
with which the theorist either perceives or imputes theoreti-
cally relevant transcendent qualities. Such abstraction is the 
key to building general theory because it permits the theo-
rist to rise above the obvious. Abstraction can be employed 
with various degrees and it can be applied to many elements 
of deviant action—the acts, the persons, the contexts, or the 
processes at work. Moreover, abstraction not only permits 
uni&cation of disparate phenomena, but it also allows for 
di!erences within abstract elements that become the tools 
for explanation. In other words, by abstracting, a theorist 
&rst ignores concrete di!erences among acts, and then iden-
ti&es, on a higher plane, new di!erences among acts or epi-
sodes that can then serve as causal variations. Abstracting, 
however, is not simply “observing” things others may not 
see, though it may involve some of that. Rather, abstraction, 
in one sense, represents an “imposition” of a new reality on 
the phenomena to be explained.
It is this aspect of general theory-building that rankles some 
scholars who cannot imagine that variables that might be 
known only to the theorist or researcher, or if known by ac-
tors, might actually appear irrelevant, can possibly account 
for human actions. On this point there is a fundamental 
di!erence of orientation among students of deviance. Some 
try to work with a concrete reality that seems apparent to 
actors and observers. To them, understanding grows from 
grasping the social world as it is experienced by the partici-
pants in actions of misconduct (Allen 2007), which almost 
always implies that explanation cannot extend beyond a 
speci&c context or, if it does, only to one similar in manifest 
ways. Others, whom I call general theorists, embrace the 
idea that even if participants have no awareness of their op-
eration, abstract processes may be at work and may account 
for outcomes. For general theorists, the key is not whether 
something makes sense to actors but whether the theoreti-
cal structure provides answers to why/how questions posed 
by a critical, scienti&cally trained audience that employs 
the ultimate criterion of predictive capability, certi&ed by 
derivation and testing of empirical relationships. 
2.1. Abstraction Concerning Offenses
One form of abstraction that is o'en employed by theorists 
has to do with features of various o!ending actions. %ough 
seemingly distinct, almost unique, o!enses may never-
theless be alike in serving theoretically relevant, abstract 
purposes for the perpetrator. As one example, assault, rape, 
vandalism, and robbery have all been conceived as alterna-
tive control-enhancing mechanisms by which an o!ender 
alters his/her position in response to a coercive environ-
ment and a provocative, humiliation-generating situation 
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(see Tittle 1995, 2004, concerning Control Balance %eory).1 
Such a distinction permits a theorist to erect an elaborate 
theoretical structure providing answers to questions about 
the conditions under which one or another deviant out-
come is likely. 
Note that this abstraction concerning the “control enhanc-
ing function” of misbehavior may be something about 
which the o!ender him/herself has no conscious awareness, 
intent, or knowledge. Moreover, it is not obvious to ob-
servers, whether they be scientists or lay persons, and may 
become cognitively real only a'er a theorist has pointed out 
the distinction. In other words, this characteristic or quality 
that unites o!enses illustrates the point made earlier that 
abstractions may be entirely “invented” or “imposed.” Yet, 
such “invented” characteristics are crucial for explanations 
within larger theoretical frameworks. Whether the explana-
tions provided by that larger framework are adequate by the 
various relevant scienti&c criteria remains to be seen, but 
it is clear that abstraction of o!enses provides explanatory 
leverage that otherwise would not be possible.
It is important to remember that abstraction not only uni-
&es its objects but it also introduces crucial di!erences that 
then become explanatory tools. For instance, if o!enses are 
tied together by their capacity to increase an individual’s 
control, those same o!enses may di!er theoretically (1) in 
the degree to which they are likely to increase a person’s 
overall control in the face of potential counter-control, (2) in 
the opportunities for their employment by a given person in 
a speci&c situation, and (3) in the potential counter-control 
they are likely to invoke. Moreover, as with other abstrac-
tions, such di!erences may have powerful implications 
despite an actor’s being unaware of them and despite the 
fact that prior to the theory, others may not have noticed 
or imagined such di!erences or their importance. %us, 
theory plays out around abstract similarities and di!erenc-
es, and one focus of such abstractions can be the potential 
o!enses.
However, some abstract conceptualizations around of-
fenses are more abstract than others and derived theories 
can be arrayed with respect to a hierarchy of generality. 
Taking note of that hierarchy is useful because it suggests 
the possibility of theoretical integration, an important step 
in increasing the adequacy of general theories (Messner, 
Krohn, and Liska 1989; Tittle 1995, 2004). Yet, considering 
levels of generality and degrees of abstractness shows that, 
though abstraction is an essential process in theory build-
ing, it is not su(cient. To underline that point, note that 
the above example of abstracting o!enses in terms of their 
control-altering possibilities in order to create a theory of 
control balancing might be regarded as a speci&c instance 
of the general formulation enunciated in General Strain 
%eory (GST) (Agnew 1992, 2001, 2006), and, as such, might 
be subsumed within that larger account. Indeed, integrat-
ing limited theories into more general formulations is an 
important ongoing process in theoretical science in pursuit 
of the most general possible theory relevant to a given set of 
phenomena. However, to accomplish that purpose it is not 
enough to enunciate an apparently more abstract principle; 
it is also necessary to &nd a way to accommodate the details 
of the theories to be integrated.
Consider General Strain %eory (GST) as a potential ab-
sorber of Control Balance %eory (CBT). GST conceives of 
assault, rape, vandalism, bank robbery, and various kinds 
of socially disapproved violence with respect to how likely 
their commission by an individual is to (1) reduce “strain” 
(a form of internal inconsistency) and/or (2) to help relieve 
negative emotions associated with such strains. O!ending 
is theorized to be caused by individual e!orts to use such 
o!ending as a means to overcome strain or the emotions 
it generates. Obviously, perceptions of having inadequate 
control, a key variable of CBT, can be conceived as one espe-
1 %ough far more complicated and rich than a brief 
account can portray, Control Balance %eory (CBT) 
argues that a person’s control ratio—the amount of 
control an individual can exercise relative to that 
which is arrayed against him or her—in*uences 
the chances of being provoked, usually by some 
form of debasement, into considering the pos-
sibility of deviant behavior. Deviant behavior is 
conceived as a maneuver to extend one’s control—to 
correct a control imbalance and to relieve feelings 
of humiliation. So, whenever a person is provoked 
into an acute realization of a control imbalance and 
comes to see deviance as a possible solution, he/she 
then decides what deviance it might be possible to 
commit without invoking counter-control greater 
than the potential gain from deviant behavior. 
%e deviance likely to be selected is theorized as 
being predictable from the original control ratio.
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cially important form of strain, while the process of control 
balancing can be conceived as a technique to try to relieve 
a particular kind of strain or the emotions of humiliation 
associated with it. %us, the argument of CBT can be sub-
sumed within the GST process of alleviating negative emo-
tions through various forms of coping. Yet, CBT contains 
crucial details that would be lost if one only observes such a 
possibility and lets it go at that.
For example, though GST features strain it does not pri-
oritize types of strain, as CBT does in its identi&cation of a 
“master strain” of control imbalance. GST does not explain 
why some situations are straining, as CBT attempts to do 
for what it treats as the most important form of strain indi-
viduals can experience. Further, although GST suggests that 
under some conditions strain gives rise to negative emo-
tions, CBT explains why control imbalances produce a par-
ticular negative emotion and describes the conditions under 
which that occurs. GST identi&es numerous conditions that 
may a!ect the direction coping might take, but it does not 
explain exactly what conditions in*uence the likely coping 
responses to particular strains or why they produce that 
e!ect, as CBT does with respect to control balancing. %us, 
theoretical integration must go well beyond formulating a 
general, abstract process, even when such a process might 
be more general. In fact, as useful as abstraction is, it can be 
over-emphasized to the neglect of other necessary elements 
for successful building of general theory.
One of those additional, crucial requirements for integra-
tion is an appropriate infrastructure with a central causal 
process within which more detailed applications can be ac-
commodated, which GST does not yet seem to have. More-
over, trying to modify GST so that it can accommodate the 
principles of CBT, as well as other theories such as Coer-
cion/Social Support (CSS) (Colvin, Cullen, and Ven 2002),2 
though laudable and perhaps an important step, is not the 
ultimate goal. A'er all, while the causal arguments of CBT 
can be conceived as an instance of the causal process enun-
ciated by GST, it is also possible to conceive of CBT as the 
more general account and allow it to absorb GST. In fact, 
given the de&ciencies in GST noted above, it might be more 
e(cient to integrate GST into CBT rather than the other 
way around. However, the goal is not to make either GST 
or CBT healthier by importing missing elements. Instead, 
theoretical science calls for a more encompassing general 
theory than either GST or CBT would become by consum-
ing the other. %e general theory we must strive for will 
express the processes set forth by control balancing, general 
strain, and other theories as well. But just as GST falters in 
its current inability to accommodate speci&c details of theo-
ries that might otherwise be candidates for assimilation, an 
even more general theory might well fail to a greater extent 
for the same reason. %e criteria for successful theoretical 
integration, then, go beyond mere generality or abstraction, 
though both are essential. 
2.2. Abstraction Concerning Individuals
A second form of theoretical abstraction concerns char-
acteristics of the individuals who might violate norms. 
%e best known usage of such abstraction is Self-Control 
%eory (SCT) (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990).3 SCT not 
only abstracts o!enses through their potential for gratify-
ing human needs, but enunciates a causal principle based 
on another kind of abstraction—the person’s ability, or 
capacity, to anticipate long-range negative consequences 
and to restrain him/herself for maximum personal bene&t 
(Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990). According to the theory, 
regardless of anything else, a person with low self-control 
who sees a chance to commit some gratifying act (including 
2 Coercion/Social Support %eory (CSS) contends 
that the balance of coercive in*uences relative to 
social support in*uences in a person’s life determines 
various outcomes. For example, a person who enjoys 
consistent social support, because of the sense of 
trust it generates, is expected to develop low levels of 
anger, high self-control, and strong, morally based 
social bonds that in turn cause pro-social behavior 
and good mental health. Erratic social support 
produces a tendency toward exploratory deviance 
because the lack of dependability in support gener-
ates moderate anger, low self-control, and social 
bonds based on calculation. Additional predictions 
are made about the e!ects of erratic and consistent 
coercion, with arguments and causal sequences 
responsible for each outcome speci&ed by the theory.
3 Self-Control %eory (SCT) argues that speci&c 
elements of child rearing a!ect the degree of self-
control a person acquires. %e level of self-control 
learned in childhood is said to remain relatively 
constant throughout the life cycle and to explain 
and predict the chances of misbehavior. %ose with 
low self-control are theorized to be highly likely to 
o!end because o!ending is potentially gratifying 
and those without strong self-control are unable to 
anticipate and act on future negative consequences 
that almost always accompany misbehavior. 
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socially disapproved ones) without much risk of immedi-
ate costs is likely to commit that act. Such a person simply 
cannot help it.
%e general characteristic of self-control, which is presumed 
to operate in all circumstances, for all individuals, and with 
respect to all forms of force or fraud undertaken for self-
grati&cation, allows explanation and prediction far more 
e!ectively than other notions about individuals. But, even 
granting such generalizing ability, one might wonder why 
self-control is a more abstract notion than, say, honesty, 
sel&shness, or greediness, all of which are common-sense 
ideas about why individuals misbehave, presumably rooted 
in everyday observations. Simply stated, the abstract notion 
of self-control is superior because it ties together six sepa-
rate individual traits, including impulsivity and a prefer-
ence for risk taking, while the presumed alternative features 
of individuals that might bear on deviance stand alone with 
little ability to unify disparate things to be explained. For 
instance, sel&shness alone does not foreshadow one’s inabil-
ity to restrain deviant impulses in those instances where de-
viant acts might result in punishment. Focusing on these as 
separate traits, or on others already mentioned, encourages 
particularity while focusing on the more abstract concept 
encourages generality. %us, honesty may help account for 
property o!enses, but it will not help in explaining violence. 
And, greed may partially account for the bank robbery but 
hardly vandalism. Low self-control however, presumably 
accounts for all of them plus other delicts.
%is is not to say that self-control is the only useful theo-
retical abstraction about individuals, that the theoretical 
apparatus within which self-control is embedded in SCT is 
su(cient, or even that Gottfredson and Hirschi’s concept 
of self-control is superior to other related concepts or to the 
self-control ideas of other theorists (examples: Muraven 
and Baumeister 2000; Muraven, Tice, and Baumeister 
1998). A'er all, numerous personality characteristics, some 
inclusive of various traits, have been identi&ed by various 
scholars, though most have proven elusive and few have the 
sweeping import of self-control (see Caspi et al. 1994; Mof-
&tt et al. 1995). Indeed, the possibilities for useful theoreti-
cal abstraction concerning individual characteristics are 
vast, particularly if abstraction of individuals is combined 
with other forms of abstraction. Moreover, just as control 
balance ideas might be subsumable under general strain 
theory, the causal processes of self-control may be encom-
passed within more general theories, such as that of Social 
Learning (Akers 1985, 1998, 2000; Bandura 1977; Burgess 
and Akers 1966) or brought into any number of theories in 
the form of contingencies for the full operation of various 
causal mechanisms set forth in those formulations (Agnew 
et al. 2002; Colvin, Cullen, and Ven 2002; Tittle 2004).
2.3. Abstraction Concerning Social Relationships
A third kind of abstraction focuses on the nature of the so-
cial networks within which individuals are embedded. %e 
well known theory (theories) of social bonding, or social 
integration (Briar and Piliavin 1965; Hirschi 1969; Nye 1958; 
Reckless 1967; Reiss 1951; Toby 1957; see also J. Braithwaite 
1989; Felson 1986; Sampson and Laub 1993; Warr 2002) 
employs abstraction of o!enses (see above), concerning the 
normative status of di!erent behaviors within a social net-
work. But, it pairs that abstraction with another one around 
which causal forces are marshaled, that of the individual’s 
relationships with the social group within which a norm 
is relevant (Horowitz 1990). Some acts are prohibited and 
some encouraged in speci&c social groups; however, the 
extent to which an individual ful&lls either of those norma-
tive mandates is theorized to depend largely on the nature 
and strength of his or her ties to the network/group. %ose 
who are bonded, or integrated (an abstract notion), are re-
strained from normative violation and constrained toward 
normative conformity, regardless of the speci&c norms. So, 
the explanatory platform for this theory rests on abstrac-
tions of social relationships and abstractions of o!enses, not 
the individual’s personal characteristics or various manifest 
characteristics of situations or people.
Here too, it is useful to remember that even though the 
abstraction of social relationships is immensely useful, it 
requires an explanatory apparatus to be theoretically po-
tent. Moreover, the theory of social integration may play an 
essential part in theoretical integration—when it is brought 
under some other explanatory umbrella, brings other ac-
counts under its tent, or is integrated with other theories us-
ing various kinds of abstractions within an entirely separate 
formulation.
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2.4. Abstraction Concerning Social Processes
A fourth form of useful theoretical abstraction is oriented 
around social processes. For instance, theorizing that 
all o!enses are products of situational stimuli activating 
learned cues for action is a powerful abstraction (Social 
Learning %eory [SLT]: see Akers 1985, 1998; 2000; Bandura 
1977; Sutherland 1939; Wilson and Herrnstein 1985). %is is 
particularly so when it is also imagined that cues for action 
become stored in the human psyche as a result of a prior 
pattern of relative reward or punishment associated with 
various lines of action and that humans are fundamentally 
oriented toward maximizing reward and minimizing costs 
(Hechter and Kanazawa 1997; McCarthy 2002). With such 
theoretical armament, a scholar is equipped to explain and 
predict all o!ending, in all circumstances, by all people 
without recourse to any inherent characteristics of the 
individuals, the o!enses, or the situation. %is, of course, 
is in contrast to the common sense idea that o!enders are 
di!erent in essential ways, that acts have inherent appeal 
or repulsion for individuals who might commit them, and 
that situations largely determine outcomes by the degree to 
which they promise certain and severe penalties for norm 
violation.
With such a broad abstraction of process, not only can 
almost any individual behavior be explained, but almost all 
other theories can be subsumed (Akers 1990). However, it 
is good to remember, again, that abstraction alone does not 
su(ce and that as useful as very general abstraction may be, 
it can actually be too much. In the case of social learning, 
the key to understanding, explaining, and predicting mis-
behavior is knowledge of prior reinforcement patterns. %e 
theory, however, does not itself explain di!erential exposure 
to varied reinforcement schedules nor does it make any oth-
er key distinctions among people, o!enses, or relationships. 
For instance, as long as reinforcement is similar, SLT makes 
no distinction among things learned. %us, in their capacity 
to compel behavior, moral notions are equal to occupational 
goals or any other things with equivalent reinforcement 
histories. Yet, other theories (see in particular Etzioni 1988; 
Scott 1971; Wikström 2006; Wikström and Treiber 2007) 
and much research (see Antonaccio and Tittle 2008 for cita-
tions) suggests that moral issues may have more force than 
non-moral issues even when both are products of similar 
learning histories. To the extent, then, that the content of 
learning matters, the very process of abstraction may defeat 
ultimate goals of theory by permitting one to ignore certain 
relevant details.
2.5. Summary
A variety of methods of abstraction have been employed 
in theoretical work to transcend surface di!erences among 
the variety of o!ending acts. %ough o!enses di!er in 
obvious ways, those di!erences become irrelevant on the 
abstract level. It is latent distinctions among acts that take 
on meaning through the abstracting process and that come 
to have explanatory import. By imagining and identifying 
those non-obvious, hidden commonalities as well as “new” 
abstract di!erences, theorizing to provide explanations em-
bedded in general principles becomes possible. Of course, 
as emphasized previously, such abstraction is only the 
beginning. If theories are to be both possible and realized 
those abstractions have to be encompassed within a causal 
framework structured to accommodate a variety of genera-
tive and restraining forces as well as various contingencies.
In this connection it is important to note that there is no 
necessary distinction between non-violent and violent devi-
ant acts. If the key to explanation lies in abstract qualities, 
then the fact that one act causes physical harm to a victim 
while another only deprives the victim of property or 
dignity is of no import whatsoever as long as the di!erent 
kinds of acts share the abstract quality around which the 
theory is built. %erefore, from the perspective of theoreti-
cal science, a general theory of socially disapproved violence 
is really no di!erent than a general theory of o!ending (or 
ultimately even of human behavior per se). Since theories of 
o!ending can be easily envisioned and in fact already exist, 
and socially disapproved violence can be conceived within 
abstract categories and principles, there is no need for 
special theories of normatively unacceptable violence. %e 
cardinal assumption of a theoretical science of misconduct, 
which I think has been ful&lled, is that all forms of such 
o!ending can be joined through abstraction, with outcomes 
being explained and predicted from general causal process-
es concerning those abstractions.
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Nevertheless, theoretically important abstract qualities 
do vary and sometimes those variations are linked to the 
“fundamental” characteristics of particular deviant acts. 
For example, most general theories of socially disapproved 
behavior identify “opportunity” to commit speci&c acts as 
an important feature of their explanatory schemes. While 
various theories seem to imply di!erent things by the 
concept (see Tittle and Botchkovar 2005: 714–15), opportu-
nity may nevertheless sometimes di!erentiate violent from 
non-violent acts of deviance. For instance, in Self-Control 
%eory (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990, 2003) opportunity 
appears to imply a situation where a given gratifying act 
of force or fraud can be committed with a minimal risk 
of immediate cost (Grasmick et al. 1993). By that de&ni-
tion, fraudulent acts (property crime) ordinarily may be 
more opportune than forceful acts. Because most people 
regard disapproved violent acts as more serious (harmful 
or consequential) than disapproved non-violent acts, they 
stand in greater readiness to do something about them. 
%erefore, it is more likely that a person, even one with 
low self-control, will confront more situations promising 
stronger risks of immediate consequences for prohibited 
violent actions than for unacceptable actions of a fraudulent 
nature. Furthermore, because the long-range consequences 
of violence are more potent than for fraud, it is harder for a 
person with weak self-control to remain oblivious to them. 
%us, Self-Control %eory may be more e!ective in explain-
ing violations of norms about property than in explaining 
disapproved violence (see Pratt and Cullen 2000) because 
the abstract formulation ties into “fundamental’ features of 
the concrete world.
As another example, Social Learning %eory (Akers 1985, 
1998) seeks the commonality of deviant behavior in the de-
gree to which it has been previously “reinforced” (learned), 
either directly or vicariously, or by self-reinforcement 
through anticipation of outcomes (see Bandura 1977). %us, 
as noted previously, theoretically it does not matter how 
di!erent an assault may appear relative to writing a hot 
check. If an individual has experienced (directly or vicari-
ously) the same amount of reward relative to punishment 
for the two acts, those behaviors are theoretically equivalent 
in their likelihood of being committed, given their physi-
cal possibility and equal chances of situational reward or 
punishment. However, in reality, the nature of reinforce-
ment for disapproved violence may be much di!erent 
than for fraudulent check writing. Given cultural norms 
emphasizing greater seriousness of violent than property 
o!ending, especially those property o!enses that do not 
involve direct invasion of privacy, learning concerning dis-
approved violence may be more &rmly linked to a person’s 
self-identity and it may have a stronger relationship with 
moral conscience (Wikström 2006; Wikström and Treiber 
2007). If so, then violence and fraudulent check writing, 
even when equally reinforced, may di!er in the likelihood 
of their expression, thereby re*ecting some “fundamental” 
di!erences.
Overall, then, inherent, obvious, surface distinctions among 
deviant acts pose no real barrier to theorizing. %e very 
nature of general theories requires that they be based on 
abstractions by which acts that appear di!erent take on la-
tent commonalities around which theoretical explanations 
are built. But, this does not imply that all di!erences among 
deviant acts are irrelevant. Good theories invent or recog-
nize di!erences relative to their own explanatory principles 
and build in accounts that hinge on those di!erences. %is 
process of spelling out theoretically relevant di!erences, 
sometimes referred to as “scope statements,” “contingen-
cies,” “conditional speci&cations, or “moderators,” is, in fact, 
essential to e!ective theory building (R. B. Braithwaite 1960; 
Cullen 1984; Walker and Cohen 1985). However, “funda-
mental” di!erences among acts of o!ending may bear on 
abstract, theoretically relevant di!erences so they are not 
always entirely outside the theoretical box. Yet, given the 
principles of abstraction and “moderation,” general theories 
can easily relegate most manifest characteristics of o!end-
ing acts to a back burner. Hence, no special theories are 
needed to explain socially disapproved violent acts, illegal 
acts against property norms, acts by females, acts by youth, 
white collar o!enses, or any other acts di!erentiated by 
external characteristics.
3. Dealing with Potential Indeterminacy
A more serious problem for general theory may be inher-
ent indeterminacy of social phenomena. It is clear that no 
theory in the current arsenal of deviance studies provides 
accurate prediction of outcomes. In fact, social scientists 
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are usually happy if their theories generate predictions that 
prove to be better than chance guesses. Even the most suc-
cessful predictive theories fall far short of being completely 
accurate. For example, tests of hypotheses from self-control 
theory, which is widely touted as one of our more success-
ful theories (see Goode 2008), generally produce predictive 
coe(cients below .30 (Pratt and Cullen 2000), and tests of 
hypotheses from social learning theory, o'en regarded as 
the leading theory of deviance (Sampson 1999), rarely yield 
predictions greater than .50 (see Akers 1998, 2000; Akers 
and Jensen 2003 for citations to the research) and even some 
of those predictions might be due to tautological mea-
surement (see Rebellon 2006). %is predictive “failure” is 
sometimes taken as evidence of inherent indeterminacy and 
some assume that such indeterminacy is at least partly due 
to the exercise of human discretion. If human behavior is 
largely non-deterministic, particularly if it is subject to free 
choice by individuals, then successful general theories of 
human behavior, especially deviance (including socially dis-
approved violence) may be unlikely, or perhaps impossible.
3.1. Attributing Human Agency
%e literature now includes a number of arguments 
concerning human agency and several studies purport to 
show, by one means or another, its actual operation (see 
Bottoms 2006). Indeed, even I have raised the specter of 
human agency in connection with self-control theory, 
arguing that people can o'en choose how much self-control 
they exercise, and o!ering some indirect evidence to that 
e!ect (Tittle, Ward and Grasmick 2004). In addition, as 
noted before, the apparent lack of success of extant theories 
presumably following the science model is sometimes taken 
as an indirect indication of human agency at work. Unfor-
tunately, given the current level of theoretical development, 
and some methodological barriers, the literature justi&es 
neither a conclusion of general indeterminacy nor that hu-
man discretion negates e!orts to build general theory.
In fact, the case for indeterminacy may be largely residual, 
resting on the uncertainty endemic to incomplete theories 
(see Tittle 1995) and *awed research. No contemporary 
theory incorporates all or even most causal forces that have 
been suggested by research or identi&ed by various speci&c 
theoretical arguments, and none speci&es a full comple-
ment of contingencies. Furthermore, not even our most 
successful theories spell out complete causal streams with 
enough tributaries to accommodate even a fraction of the 
potential complexity of social misconduct. Correspond-
ingly, empirical research guided by such theories has failed 
to produce full prediction.
Moreover, research suggesting unpredictability of human 
behavior (examples include Felson and Steadman 1983; 
Luckenbill 1977) or indeterminacy (see Bandura 1989, 2001; 
Kahneman and Tversky 2000) does not indicate random-
ness. Indeed, theorists have set forth a number of strong 
statements about the forces operative in emergent out-
comes (Tedeschi and Felson 1994) and there is good reason 
to believe that even human agency is exercised within 
constraining parameters (see especially Kahneman and 
Tversky 2000). %e more that is known about individuals 
and the relevant constraints a!ecting their behavior, the 
better can decisions, even those following mutual reaction 
patterns, be anticipated. %us, the science of human deci-
sion making, though far from providing full explanation, 
suggests distinct patterning. Whether a driver will take 
the right or the le' fork may be largely predetermined, if 
for no other reason than habit (Bandura 1977). Of course, 
simple, isolated choices are easier to explain than complex 
series of decisions made in a social context, but the promise 
of explanation—even of complex choices—is real. At the 
very least, evidence suggests that good theory, informed by 
research, can narrow the zone of non-predictability.
If theoretical developments concerning disapproved con-
duct continue at their recent pace, speci&c theory fragments 
(o'en now treated as if they were full theories) are likely to 
become more encompassing and more adequate. Moreover, 
it is not out of the question to expect the emergence of a 
general, overarching, dominant, integrated theory based on 
a central causal process that accommodates or integrates 
the forces currently associated with numerous theoretical 
accounts that try to stand alone. Such a theory may gener-
ate far better predictions than now follow from an inchoate 
theoretical repertoire. As those developments unfold, the 
zone of apparent indeterminacy may well narrow. %is, of 
course, is an expectation &lled with optimism and con&-
dence in the enterprise of theoretical science. Not every-
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body shares such a hopeful outlook. My reason for doing 
so rests on the progress that has been made within the past 
twenty to twenty-&ve years. At the beginning of that era, I 
argued that theoretical science had been underrated, mis-
practiced, and prematurely judged by students of deviance, 
and that only time would tell if it could realize its promise 
(Tittle 1985). Subsequently, we have seen much theoretical 
ferment, with several innovative formulations having been 
produced. Some of those e!orts have set forth unusual ideas 
(examples: control balance, Tittle 1995, 2004; coercion/
social support, Colvin, Cullen, and Ven 2002; morality–
Wikström 2006; Wikström and Treiber 2007; self-control, 
Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990) and some have elaborated 
and improved existing notions in an integrative process 
of borrowing, re&ning, and transforming extant formula-
tions (for examples see: general strain theory, Agnew 1992; 
2006; shaming theory, J. Braithwaite 1989; social control/
learning, Heimer and Matsueda 1994; self-esteem/defense 
theory, Kaplan 1995; institutional anomie theory, Messner 
and Rosenfeld 2001 [1994]; and social bonds, Sampson and 
Laub 1993). %e net result is a marked improvement in abil-
ity to explain deviance and deviance-related phenomena, 
with consequent enhancement of predictive capabilities. If 
this trend continues—and there is much reason to think it 
will—less and less room will be le' for speculation about 
indeterminacy as the process of theoretical science unfolds.
Further progress, however, does not depend entirely on the-
oretical improvement. Research problems always lurk in the 
shadows of science, only partly dependent on the adequacy 
of theories. %eories are intellectual edi&ces, constructed of 
abstractions whose inherent meanings exist in the minds 
of the theorists. However, if such intellectual structures are 
to be more than simply solutions to cognitive puzzles, they 
must be applicable to, and account for, the social world, 
which can only be certi&ed by empirical test. But, testing 
assumes accurate derivation of hypotheses bearing on the 
real world, drawn from abstract notions. %e con&dence of 
the scienti&c community in a given abstract formulation 
depends on the extent to which predictions derived from it 
hold up when subjected to carefully organized observations.
Two major disconnects, however, characterize the process 
of translating theoretical arguments into hypotheses (or 
series of hypotheses and/or causal models) about the real 
world and trying to transform concepts into variables. %e 
&rst stems from unclear theories. %eoretical ambiguity, 
sometimes inadvertent (see Tittle 2004 for an illustration 
of this), may lead to hypotheses that do not, in fact, repre-
sent relationships implied by the theory, to contradictory 
hypotheses, or to instances in which diametrically opposite 
&ndings are interpreted by some scholars as providing sup-
port for a theory and by others as constituting a challenge 
to that theory. A collective body of evidence supposedly 
bearing on a theory, therefore, may actually be largely ir-
relevant, tangential, or misleading. 
%e second kink, however, occurs when correctly drawn 
hypotheses are inappropriately tested, o'en because of 
weak or misdirected measurement. Measurement is the 
bridge between two di!erent worlds, the intellectual and 
the empirical, and so is always somewhat uncertain. It is 
never entirely clear whether theoretical failure (or success, 
for that matter) is due to features of the theory itself, such 
as being impervious to agency, or to the way the concepts 
are operationalized. Given the di(culties of making a true 
and faithful translation of an intellectual product into an 
empirical tool, even very good theories may show dimin-
ished empirical performance (or in some cases such as 
making peer in*uence the test of social learning, showing 
more support than may be warranted). Of course, some 
theories may simply be wrong, but, it is also true that many 
relatively clear concepts are spoiled by researchers so that 
“tests” are o'en invalid. Empirical de&ciencies, therefore, 
make it impossible at the present time to judge the achieve-
ments of a deviance studies guided by theoretical science or 
to conclude that indeterminacy prevails. 
%ese theoretical/empirical de&ciencies also impinge on 
“direct” evidence about human agency, which may ap-
pear to show the operation of unin*uenced/undetermined 
action only because theories are yet incomplete or because 
research tools are de&cient. In view of such possibilities, it is 
simply too soon to draw a strong conclusion about agency 
or indeterminacy. Ultimately, both forms of uncertainty 
may be proven, but in the meantime, there is ample reason 
to proceed as if it does not matter. We do not know what 
can be accomplished until the process of science has more 
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fully unfolded. Unfortunately, theoretical science moves 
extremely slowly and so far in its focus on socially disap-
proved behavior the process has only just begun to *ourish.
3.2. Indeterminacy, Probability, and Social Science
Even if deviant behavior, including socially disapproved 
violence, turns out to be somewhat indeterminate, such 
indeterminacy does not necessarily constitute a barrier to 
general theory. While it would be neater and more conve-
nient if the social world were absolutely known to be deter-
mined so that one could imagine complete explanation with 
accompanying total prediction, science does not require it. 
%ere is no logical reason why theories cannot specify caus-
al processes that operate up to a point or specify probabilis-
tic relationships/e!ects. %e fact that most of our research 
methods are probabilistically based while our theories are 
deterministic is o'en taken to be an unfortunate inconsis-
tency. However, it is easy to imagine that our theories and 
the hypotheses they spawn are, in fact, probabilistically, not 
deterministically, rooted. %us, probabilistic research tools 
may actually match a probabilistic subject domain.
Building general theories to account for a probabilistic 
rather than a deterministic world requires only slight 
modi&cation of current practice. First, theorists can do 
what empirical scholars using regression analysis currently 
do: explain as much as can be explained and then allocate 
the remaining unexplained portion to a residual category. 
Empirical scholars call the residual category an “error term” 
which is brought into predictive equations to &ll out a ma-
trix to avoid statistical problems of mis-speci&cation. Like-
wise, theorists could specify what part of a phenomenon is 
to be explained by particular theoretical premises and what 
part is to be treated as a residual e!ect. In reality, all social 
scientists now employ this maneuver in their treatment of 
biological/genetic in*uences. Only the most conservative 
social scientists continue to discount the import of such 
forces (see, for example, discussions in Ellis and Walsh 1997; 
Guo, Roetter, and Cai 2008), although there may be much 
disagreement about the extent of their in*uence. Never-
theless, even those who recognize that social factors may 
interact with genetic/biological elements still largely exclude 
consideration of such in*uences from theoretical formula-
tions. Similarly, most social researchers simply attribute 
those genetic/biological components that might be opera-
tive to “error,” which is usually assumed to be relatively 
small. Social scientists are simply unequipped to deal with 
the mysterious world of genetic/biological in*uences whose 
secrets are slowly being unlocked by physical scientists. In 
the meantime, the work of social science proceeds with a 
fair degree of success and with little worry that such in*u-
ences may eventually have to be accommodated explicitly.
Second, instead of bifurcating phenomena to be explained 
into explicable and inexplicable zones, all explanations 
could postulate probabilistic e!ects all along the causal 
continuum. %e task for theorists then would be to spell 
out the degrees of chance that are incorporated into given 
outcomes, to identify the forces that in*uence them, and to 
explain why and how those probabilistic processes operate. 
In other words, while most contemporary social theorists 
(like their predecessors) conduct their work as if social 
behavior, especially deviance, were determined (even when 
they may not actually believe it), they do not have to do so. 
%eorists could, instead, embrace indeterminacy and theo-
rize about it directly.
3.3. Summary
While the possibility of indeterminism, particularly involv-
ing human agency, is a real concern for theoretical science, 
it does not necessarily constitute an insurmountable barrier. 
For one thing, we do not yet know how indeterminate hu-
man behavior is or the extent to which such indeterminacy 
actually hinders progress. Indeed, the results of research 
on uncertain outcomes and on human decision making 
suggest that very little human behavior is random, includ-
ing the exercise of agency. To specify the degree to which 
human action can ultimately be explained and predicted, 
theorists must act now “as if” all were determined, letting 
the &nal decisions about indeternminacy rest on the prod-
ucts of a more fully exercised scienti&c process. %eoretical 
successes of the past two or so decades give cause for opti-
mism in that regard. However, even if theorists do prema-
turely conclude that indeterminism and human agency 
must be accepted, they can adopt working strategies to deal 
with them. One such strategy involves sorting aspects of 
social phenomena into explicable and inexplicable zones, 
with the inexplicable parts being allocated to a residual “er-
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ror” category much as regression analyses separate compo-
nents that are accounted for from those le' unexplained. 
A second, little-tried approach is to confront probabilistic 
e!ects head on, providing explanations directly suited for 
uncertain outcomes.
4. Conclusions about General Theories of Offending
Based on the reasoning presented above, general theories 
of deviance that encompass socially disapproved violence 
are not only feasible but mandatory if we are to do our jobs 
as scholars trying to account for the phenomena in our do-
main. Fortunately, some success has already been achieved 
in developing such theories, as should be clear from some 
of the illustrations used in previous sections of this paper. 
Indeed, the contemporary theoretical tool box contains at 
least seven general theories of crime/deviance that encom-
pass socially disapproved violence: social learning, general 
strain, self, social support/coercion, social integration/social 
control, self-control, and control balance. Each of these for-
mulations contains abstractions designed to answer ques-
tions of “why” and “how” about behavioral patterns that are 
not limited to speci&c contexts or features. Moreover, all of 
them state at least one contingency under which the causal 
forces of the theory are said to operate with greater or less 
force.
%e problem, therefore, is not a dearth of theories; it is 
that extant theories are not adequate to the job. Adequate 
theories within the philosophy of theoretical science must 
ful&ll &ve requirements. First, they have to explain the 
things within their domains. %at is, they must answer the 
questions of “why” and “how” in a way that satis&es the 
intellectual curiosity of an audience trained to ask deeper 
and deeper questions and to be skeptical of answers. Such 
an audience will naturally expect the abstract formula-
tions to provide explanations of at least a good proportion 
of the phenomena within their domains within a common 
causal network. Second, theories must be testable and have 
been su!ciently tested to verify them as consistent with the 
empirical world. %at is, their abstract formulations must 
yield numerous statements of relationships applicable in the 
concrete world that conceivably can be falsi&ed but in fact 
turn out to be supported by empirical tests. %ird, theories 
should provide comprehensive accounts that accommodate 
all of the relevant causal forces that come into play. Fourth, 
adequate theories must be precise; that is, they should iden-
tify the conditions that in*uence exactly when and to what 
degree the causal processes will unfold, the nature of the 
causal e!ects (such as the form or shape of a causal relation-
ship), and the time interval between the proposed causes 
and the expected e!ects. Fi'h, good theories must specify 
full causal sequences and provide logical rationales for the 
connections among the parts, a feature called depth.
None of the contemporary theories listed above measures 
up to these standards. Some come closer than others but all 
fall short in one or another respect, and speci&c ones some-
times fail in multiple respects. One helpful approach for 
overcoming such de&ciencies may be some form of further 
theoretical integration. Although some of the contemporary 
theories are themselves integrations of disparate theoretical 
parts, there still remains much potential complementarity 
among the seven contenders. Moreover, given that each of 
the theories cited enjoys some degree of logical and empiri-
cal support, at the very least the criterion of comprehensive-
ness suggests a need for still more integration.
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